

Duality-based reformulations in bilevel optimization

Part II

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Contents

1. Nonlinear bilevel programming

- Network design problem
- User equilibrium
- Duality

2. Mixed-integer bilevel programming

- Combinatorial pricing problem
- Lower-level representation
- An example
- Value function
- Decision diagrams
- Selection diagrams
- Computational results
- Key takeaways
- Related reformulations

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Bilevel network design problem

$$\min_{x,z} \sum_{a \in A} \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right) \theta_a \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right) \quad (\text{System Optimum Objective})$$

s.t. $x \in X$

$z \in Z(x)$ (User Equilibrium)

Bilevel network design problem

$$\min_{x,z} \sum_{a \in A} \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right) \theta_a \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right) \quad (\text{System Optimum Objective})$$

$$\text{s.t. } x \in X$$

$$z \in Z(x) \quad (\text{User Equilibrium})$$

Travel time function

$$\theta_a(s) = f_a + g_a s^p$$

where $f_a \geq 0$ and $g_a \geq 0$ and $p \in \mathbb{Z}_{>0}$.

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
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Followers


Total flow of 4.



Followers

Total flow of 4. User equilibrium: No incentive to deviate.

$$\text{flow} = 2, \text{ time} = 3 + (2/2)^4 + 3 = 7$$



$$\text{flow} = 2, \text{ time} = 2 + 1 + (2/2)^4 + 3 = 7$$

Followers [Beckmann et al., 1955]

Primal Formulation [Beckmann et al., 1955]

$$\phi(x) = \min_z \sum_{a \in A(x)} \int_0^{\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa}} \theta_a(s) ds \quad (1a)$$

$$\text{s.t.} \quad \sum_{a \in A_v^+(x)} z_{oa} - \sum_{a \in A_v^-(x)} z_{oa} = e_{ov}, \quad \forall o \in O, v \in V, \quad (1b)$$

$$z \geq 0. \quad (1c)$$

- ▶ $O = \{v \in V : \exists k \in K, o_k = v\}$
- ▶ $e_{ov} = \sum_{k \in K: o \in k} e'_{kv}$ where $e'_{ko_k} = -e_k$, $e'_{kd_k} = e_k$, $e'_{kv} = 0$ for $v \notin \{o_k, d_k\}$.
- ▶ z_{oa} : Flow of users originating from o traversing arc a .

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Followers' dual

To derive KKT conditions, we first introduce dual variables for our constraints:

- ▶ π_{ov} : Dual variable for flow conservation.
- ▶ $\lambda_{oa} \geq 0$: Dual variable for non-negativity constraints.

The Full Lagrangian $\mathcal{L}(z, \pi, \lambda)$

$$\begin{aligned}
 \mathcal{L} = & \sum_{a \in A(x)} \int_0^{\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa}} \theta_a(s) ds \\
 & - \sum_{o \in O} \sum_{v \in V} \pi_{ov} \underbrace{\left(\sum_{a \in A_v^+(x)} z_{oa} - \sum_{a \in A_v^-(x)} z_{oa} - e_{ov} \right)}_{\text{Flow Conservation}} \\
 & - \sum_{o \in O} \sum_{a \in A(x)} \lambda_{oa} z_{oa}
 \end{aligned}$$

Optimality conditions

Taking the gradient of \mathcal{L} with respect to flow on arc $a = (t, h)$:

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Because λ_{oa} is non-negativity, $\lambda_{oa} \geq 0$. We substitute:

$$\theta_a \left(\sum_{o' \in O} z_{o'a} \right) - \pi_{oh} + \pi_{ot} = \lambda_{oa} \geq 0$$

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Applying **complementary slackness** ($\lambda_{oa} z_{oa} = 0$):

$$\left(\theta_a \left(\sum_{o' \in O} z_{o'a} \right) - \pi_{oh} + \pi_{ot} \right) z_{oa} = 0$$

We have fully eliminated λ from the system.

Optimality conditions

KKT Conditions

$$\sum_{a \in A_v^+(x)} z_{oa} - \sum_{a \in A_v^-(x)} z_{oa} = e_{ov}, \quad \forall o \in O, v \in V$$

(Primal Feas.)

$$\theta_a \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right) - \pi_{oh} + \pi_{ot} \geq 0, \quad \forall o \in O, a = (t, h) \in A(x)$$

(Dual Feas.)

$$\left(\theta_a \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right) - \pi_{oh} + \pi_{ot} \right) z_{oa} = 0, \quad \forall o \in O, a = (t, h) \in A(x)$$

(Comp. Slack.)

$$z \geq 0.$$

(Non-negativity)

Optimality conditions

Recall $\theta_a(s) = f_a + g_a s^p$.

Step 1: Substitute the specific travel time function into the integral.

$$L(z, \pi) = \sum_{a \in A(x)} \int_0^{\sum z_{oa}} \theta_a(s) ds - \sum_{o \in O, v \in V} \pi_{ov} (\text{Flow Cons.})$$

=

=

=

Optimality conditions

Recall $\theta_a(s) = f_a + g_a s^p$.

Step 2: Expand the integral and distribute the node potential duals (π).

$$\begin{aligned}
 L(z, \pi) &= \sum_{a \in A(x)} \int_0^{\sum z_{oa}} \theta_a(s) ds - \sum_{o \in O, v \in V} \pi_{ov} (\text{Flow Cons.}) \\
 &= \sum_a \left(f_a \left(\sum z_{oa} \right) + \frac{g_a}{p+1} \left(\sum z_{oa} \right)^{p+1} \right) - \sum_{o, a=(t, h)} (\pi_{oh} - \pi_{ot}) z_{oa} + \sum_k e_k (\pi_{ok} d_k - \pi_{ok} o_k) \\
 &= \\
 &=
 \end{aligned}$$

Optimality conditions

Recall $\theta_a(s) = f_a + g_a s^p$.

Step 3: Regroup per arc. Introduce $(\pi_{oh} - \pi_{ot} - f_a)$ and isolate demand.

$$\begin{aligned}
 L(z, \pi) &= \sum_{a \in A(x)} \int_0^{\sum z_{oa}} \theta_a(s) ds - \sum_{o \in O, v \in V} \pi_{ov} (\text{Flow Cons.}) \\
 &= \sum_a \left(f_a (\sum z_{oa}) + \frac{g_a}{p+1} (\sum z_{oa})^{p+1} \right) - \sum_{o, a=(t, h)} (\pi_{oh} - \pi_{ot}) z_{oa} + \sum_k e_k (\pi_{ok} d_k - \pi_{ok} o_k) \\
 &= \sum_a \left(\underbrace{\frac{g_a}{p+1} (\sum z_{oa})^{p+1} - \sum_o (\pi_{oh} - \pi_{ot} - f_a) z_{oa}}_{L_a(z_a, \pi_a)} \right) + \sum_k e_k (\pi_{ok} d_k - \pi_{ok} o_k) \\
 &=
 \end{aligned}$$

Optimality conditions

Recall $\theta_a(s) = f_a + g_a s^p$.

Step 4: Isolate the arc-wise component $L_a(z_a, \pi_a)$. The problem now separates!

$$\begin{aligned}
 L(z, \pi) &= \sum_{a \in A(x)} \int_0^{\sum z_{oa}} \theta_a(s) ds - \sum_{o \in O, v \in V} \pi_{ov} (\text{Flow Cons.}) \\
 &= \sum_a \left(f_a \left(\sum z_{oa} \right) + \frac{g_a}{p+1} \left(\sum z_{oa} \right)^{p+1} \right) - \sum_{o, a=(t, h)} (\pi_{oh} - \pi_{ot}) z_{oa} + \sum_k e_k (\pi_{ok} d_k - \pi_{ok} o_k) \\
 &= \sum_a \left(\underbrace{\frac{g_a}{p+1} \left(\sum z_{oa} \right)^{p+1} - \sum_o (\pi_{oh} - \pi_{ot} - f_a) z_{oa}}_{L_a(z_a, \pi_a)} \right) + \sum_k e_k (\pi_{ok} d_k - \pi_{ok} o_k) \\
 &= \sum_{a \in A(x)} L_a(z_a, \pi_a) + \sum_{k \in K} e_k (\pi_{ok} d_k - \pi_{ok} o_k)
 \end{aligned}$$

Optimality conditions

Lagrangian dual problem

$$\max_{\pi} \min_{z \geq 0} L(z, \pi) = \max_{\pi} \left\{ \sum_{a \in A(x)} \min_{z \geq 0} L_a(z_a, \pi_a) + \sum_{k \in K} e_k(\pi_{o_k d_k} - \pi_{o_k o_k}) \right\}$$

Solving $\min_{z \geq 0} L_a(z_a, \pi_a)$ analytically yields a piecewise function dependent on g_a [Sugishita et al., 2025]. To linearize it, we introduce η_a :

$$\eta_a = \max_{o \in O} \{\pi_{oh} - \pi_{ot} - f_a\} \Leftrightarrow \eta_a \geq \pi_{oh} - \pi_{ot} - f_a \quad \forall o \in O$$

Dual Formulation

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\pi, \eta} \quad & \sum_{k \in K} e_k(\pi_{o_k d_k} - \pi_{o_k o_k}) - \sum_{a \in A(x)} \frac{p}{\bar{g}_a^{1/p}(p+1)} \eta_a^{\frac{p+1}{p}} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \eta_a \geq \pi_{oh} - \pi_{ot} - f_a, \quad \forall o \in O, a = (t, h) \in A(x), \\ & \eta_a = 0, \quad \forall a \in A(x) : g_a = 0 \\ & \eta \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Reformulation

Constraints are linear and the objective is separable and convex (monotropic programming).

Reformulation

Constraints are linear and the objective is separable and convex (monotropic programming).

1. Both follower's primal and dual formulations are feasible $\forall x \in X$.
2. **Strong duality holds.**
3. Primal/Dual variables are optimal \iff they satisfy the KKT conditions.

Primal Problem

$$\begin{aligned} \min_z \quad & \sum_{a \in A(x)} \int_0^{z_{oa}} \theta_a(s) ds \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \sum_{a \in A_v^+(x)} z_{oa} - \sum_{a \in A_v^-(x)} z_{oa} = e_{ov} \\ & z \geq 0. \end{aligned}$$

Dual Problem

$$\begin{aligned} \max_{\pi, \eta} \quad & \sum_k e_k (\pi_{od} d_d - \pi_{oa} o_a) \\ & - \sum_a \frac{p}{g_a^{1/p} (p+1)} \eta_a^{\frac{p+1}{p}} \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & \eta_a \geq \pi_{oh} - \pi_{ot} - f_a \\ & \eta_a = 0 \quad a \in A(x) : g_a = 0 \\ & \eta \geq 0 \end{aligned}$$

Reformulation

The original Bilevel Network Design Problem:

$$\begin{aligned} \min_{x,z} \quad & \sum_{a \in A} \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right) \theta_a \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right) \quad (\text{System Optimum Objective}) \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & x \in X, z \in Z(x) \quad (\text{Follower's Equilibrium}) \end{aligned}$$

Reformulation

The original Bilevel Network Design Problem:

$$\min_{x,z} \sum_{a \in A} \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right) \theta_a \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right) \quad (\text{System Optimum Objective})$$

$$\text{s.t. } x \in X, z \in Z(x) \quad (\text{Follower's Equilibrium})$$

Dualize-and-combine Formulation

$$\min_{x,z,\pi,\eta} \sum_{a \in A} \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right) \theta_a \left(\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa} \right)$$

$$\text{s.t. } \underbrace{\sum_{a \in A} \int_0^{\sum_{o \in O} z_{oa}} \theta_a(s) ds}_{\text{convex in } z} \leq \underbrace{\sum_{k \in K} e_k (\pi_{o_k} d_k - \pi_{o_k} o_k) - \sum_{a \in A} \frac{p}{\bar{g}_a^{1/p} (p+1)} \eta_a^{\frac{p+1}{p}}}_{\text{concave in } (\pi, \eta)} \quad (\text{Strong Duality})$$

$$\sum_{a \in A^+} z_{oa} - \sum_{a \in A^-} z_{oa} = e_{ov}, \quad z_{oa} \leq \sum_{k \in K_o} e_k x_a \quad (\text{primal constraints})$$

$$\eta_a \geq \pi_{oh} - \pi_{ot} - f_a - M_{oa}(1 - x_a) \quad (\text{dual constraints})$$

$$\eta_a = 0 \text{ (if } g_a = 0), z \geq 0, \eta \geq 0, x \in X$$

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The problem

Combinatorial pricing problems (CPP)


- ▶ Leader: sets prices (tolls)
- ▶ Follower(s): solves combinatorial problem
 - ▶ Shortest path → Network pricing problem (NPP)
 - ▶ Knapsack → Knapsack pricing problem
 - ▶ Min set cover pricing, Max stable set pricing, etc.

Natural (non-linear) bilevel formulation

Network pricing problem

$$\max_{t, x} \left\{ \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} t^\top x^k \mid \begin{array}{ll} t_a \geq 0 & \forall a \in \mathcal{A}_1 \\ t_a = 0 & \forall a \in \mathcal{A}_2 \\ x^k \in \mathbf{R}^k(t) & \forall k \in \mathcal{K} \end{array} \right\}$$


$$\mathbf{R}^k(t) := \operatorname{argmin}_{x^k} \left\{ (c + t)^\top x^k \mid \begin{array}{l} Ax^k = b^k \\ x^k \in \{0, 1\}^{|\mathcal{A}^k|} \end{array} \right\} \quad \forall k \in \mathcal{K}$$



Network pricing problem

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
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
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
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
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
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
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$$\text{rev} = (1 + 4) + (4 + 2) = 11$$

Network pricing problem

Solving components [Bui et al., 2022]

- ▶ Primal representation (of the lower-level)
- ▶ Dual representation (of the lower-level)
- ▶ Optimality conditions
- ▶ Linearization

Network pricing problem

Solving components [Bui et al., 2022]

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- ▶ Linearization

Primal arc, Dual arc, Strong duality

$$\begin{aligned}
 \max \quad & \sum_{k \in \mathcal{K}} t^\top x^k \\
 \text{s.t.} \quad & Ax^k = b^k && k \in \mathcal{K}, \\
 & x^k \geq 0 && k \in \mathcal{K}, \\
 & A^\top y^k \leq c + t && k \in \mathcal{K}, \\
 & (c + t)^\top x^k = (b^k)^\top y^k && k \in \mathcal{K}, \\
 & t \in \mathcal{T}.
 \end{aligned}$$

└ Mixed-integer bilevel programming

└ Combinatorial pricing problem

Combinatorial pricing problem

The lower level is a combinatorial optimization problem
expressed as a binary linear program

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What is the lower-level dual? No compact set of optimality conditions

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What is the lower-level dual? No compact set of optimality conditions

How to solve the CPP effectively?

Overview

► Literature:

- Single-commodity NPP:
well-studied [Labbé et al., 1998, Brotcorne et al., 2001]
- Multi-commodity NPP: recently studied through the lens of strong bilevel feasibility [Bui et al., 2024]
- General CPP: only approximation & complexity results
 - Σ_2^P -hard result [Böhnlein et al., 2023, Grüne et al., 2025]
 - NP-hardness: lower-level is a shortest path [Roch et al., 2005] or a minimum spanning tree [Cardinal et al., 2011]
- Recent technique to formulate the dual of the lower-level [Lozano et al., 2022, Bui et al., 2025, Vásquez et al., 2025]

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 - ▶ Recent technique to formulate the dual of the lower-level [Lozano et al., 2022, Bui et al., 2025, Vásquez et al., 2025]
- ▶ Goals:
 - ▶ Generalize ideas from the NPP to CPPs
 - ▶ Obtain tractable reformulations

Contents

1. Nonlinear bilevel programming

- Network design problem
- User equilibrium
- Duality

2. Mixed-integer bilevel programming

- Combinatorial pricing problem
- Lower-level representation
- An example
- Value function
- Decision diagrams
- Selection diagrams
- Computational results
- Key takeaways
- Related reformulations

Novel ideas [Bui et al., 2025]

Solve the CPP using embedded dynamic programming models

- ▶ Formulation of the CPP using dynamic programming
 - ▶ Decision diagram
 - ▶ Selection diagram
- ▶ Dynamic constraint generation

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Knapsack pricing problem

- ▶ Items \mathcal{I}
 - ▶ Weights w_i for $i \in \mathcal{I}$
 - ▶ Base profits p_i for $i \in \mathcal{I}$
- ▶ Capacity C
- ▶ Tolled items $\mathcal{I}_1 \subseteq \mathcal{I}$
 - ▶ Tolls t_i for $i \in \mathcal{I}_1$
- ▶ Follower's decision x in $\{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}}$

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 - ▶ Tolls t_i for $i \in \mathcal{I}_1$
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$$\max_{t,x} \left\{ t^\top x \mid \begin{array}{ll} t_i \geq 0 & \forall i \in \mathcal{I}_1 \\ t_i = 0 & \forall i \in \mathcal{I}_2 = \mathcal{I} \setminus \mathcal{I}_1 \\ x \in \mathbf{R}(t) \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\mathbf{R}(t) := \operatorname{argmax}_x \left\{ (p - t)^\top x \mid \begin{array}{l} w^\top x \leq C \\ x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}} \end{array} \right\}$$

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Value function formulation

$$\max t^\top x$$

$$\text{s.t. } w^\top x \leq C,$$

$$x \in \{0, 1\}^I,$$

$$L \geq (p - t)^\top \hat{x},$$

$$(p - t)^\top x = L,$$

$$t \in \mathcal{T}.$$

$$\max_z \left\{ \sum_{\hat{x} \in \mathcal{X}} ((v-t)^\top \hat{x}) z_{\hat{x}} \mid \sum_{\hat{x} \in \mathcal{X}} z_{\hat{x}} = 1, z \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{X}} \right\}$$

$$\min_L \{L \mid L \geq (v-t)^\top \hat{x}, \hat{x} \in \mathcal{X}\}.$$

$$\hat{x} \in \mathcal{X},$$

- ▶ $L \geq (p - t)^\top \hat{x}$ is generated dynamically
 - ▶ Solve master problem for t
 - ▶ Solve knapsack problem given t to obtain \hat{x}
 - ▶ Repeat

Value function example

\mathcal{I}	1	2	3	4
w	1	1	1	2
C	3			
p	1	1	1	1
\hat{x}	1	1	1	0
	1	0	0	1
	0	1	0	1
	0	0	1	1

$$\max t^\top x$$

$$\text{s.t. } w^\top x \leq C,$$

$$x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}},$$

$$L \geq 3 - t_1 - t_2 - t_3,$$

$$L \geq 2 - t_1,$$


$$L \geq 2 - t_2,$$

$$L \geq 2 - t_3,$$

$$(p - t)^\top x = L,$$

$$t \in \mathcal{T}.$$

VF as Dynamic programming model



$$L = y_o - y_d$$

$$\max t^\top x$$

$$\text{s.t. } w^\top x \leq C,$$

$$x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}},$$

$$L \geq 3 - t_1 - t_2 - t_3,$$

$$L \geq 2 - t_1,$$

$$L \geq 2 - t_2,$$

$$L \geq 2 - t_3,$$

$$(p - t)^\top x = L,$$

$$t \in \mathcal{T}.$$

VF as Dynamic programming model




$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & t^\top x \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & w^\top x \leq C, \\ & x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}}, \end{aligned}$$

$$L = y_o - y_d$$

$$\begin{aligned} (p - t)^\top x &= L, \\ t &\in \mathcal{T}. \end{aligned}$$

Remark: We keep the primal representation and not the path formulation.

VF as Dynamic programming model



$$\max t^\top x$$

$$\text{s.t. } w^\top x \leq C,$$

$$x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}},$$

$$L \geq 3 - t_1 - t_2 - t_3,$$


$$L = y_o - y_d$$

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$$L = y_o - y_d$$

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$$\text{s.t. } w^\top x \leq C,$$

$$x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}},$$

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
$$L \geq 2 - t_1,$$

$$(p - t)^\top x = L,$$

$$t \in \mathcal{T}.$$

Remark: We keep the primal representation and not the path formulation.

VF as Dynamic programming model



$$L = y_o - y_d$$

$$\max t^\top x$$

$$\text{s.t. } w^\top x \leq C,$$

$$x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}},$$

$$L \geq 3 - t_1 - t_2 - t_3,$$

$$L \geq 2 - t_1,$$


$$L \geq 2 - t_2,$$

$$(p - t)^\top x = L,$$

$$t \in \mathcal{T}.$$

Remark: We keep the primal representation and not the path formulation.

VF as Dynamic programming model



$$L = y_o - y_d$$

$$\max t^\top x$$

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
$$L \geq 2 - t_3,$$

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Remark: We keep the primal representation and not the path formulation.

Key idea



(if primal is a maximization)

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Decision diagram

40

$$\begin{aligned} \max \quad & t^\top x \\ \text{s.t.} \quad & w^\top x \leq C, \\ & x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}}, \end{aligned}$$

03

Layer, Remaining capacity


Solid: $x_i = 1$ Dashed: $x_i = 0$

$$(p - t)^\top x = y_{03} - y_{40},$$

$$t \in \mathcal{T}.$$

Decision diagram

40



Layer, Remaining capacity

Solid: $x_i = 1$ Dashed: $x_i = 0$

$$\max t^\top x$$

$$\text{s.t. } w^\top x \leq C,$$

$$x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}},$$

$$y_{03} - y_{13} \geq 0,$$

$$y_{03} - y_{12} \geq 1 - t_1,$$

$$y_{12} - y_{22} \geq 0,$$

$$y_{13} - y_{23} \geq 0,$$


$$y_{12} - y_{21} \geq 1 - t_2,$$

$$y_{13} - y_{22} \geq 1 - t_2,$$

$$(p - t)^\top x = y_{03} - y_{40},$$

$$t \in \mathcal{T}.$$

Decision diagram



Layer, Remaining capacity

Solid: $x_i = 1$ Dashed: $x_i = 0$

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
⋮

$$(p - t)^\top x = y_{03} - y_{40},$$

$$t \in \mathcal{T}.$$

Paths in decision diagram

$\hat{x} \in \mathcal{X} \leftrightarrow$ Paths in decision diagram




$$\hat{x} = (1, 1, 1, 0)$$

$$(p - t)^\top \hat{x} = 3 - t_1 - t_2 - t_3$$

Paths in decision diagram

$\hat{x} \in \mathcal{X} \leftrightarrow$ Paths in decision diagram




$$\hat{x} = (1, 0, 0, 1)$$

$$(p - t)^\top \hat{x} = 2 - t_1$$

Paths in decision diagram

$\hat{x} \in \mathcal{X} \leftrightarrow$ Paths in decision diagram




$$\hat{x} = (0, 1, 0, 1)$$

$$(p - t)^\top \hat{x} = 2 - t_2$$

Paths in decision diagram

$\hat{x} \in \mathcal{X} \leftrightarrow$ Paths in decision diagram



$$\hat{x} = (0, 0, 1, 1)$$

$$(p - t)^\top \hat{x} = 2 - t_3$$


Dynamically-generated constraints in DD

- ▶ Start with some nodes
- ▶ Given \hat{x} , try to fit a path \rightarrow new constraints
- ▶ Worst-case: value function constraint



Dynamically-generated constraints in DD

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


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


$$\hat{x} = (0, 0, 1, 1)$$

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Dynamically-generated constraints in DD

- ▶ Start with some nodes
- ▶ Given \hat{x} , try to fit a path \rightarrow new constraints
- ▶ Worst-case: value function constraint




$$\hat{x} = (1, 0, 0, 1)$$

$$(p - t)^\top \hat{x} = 2 - t_1$$

Dynamically-generated constraints in DD

- ▶ Start with some nodes
- ▶ Given \hat{x} , try to fit a path \rightarrow new constraints
- ▶ Worst-case: value function constraint



$$\hat{x} = (0, 1, 0, 1)$$

$$(p - t)^\top \hat{x} = 2 - t_2$$

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
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Selection diagram

At step k :


- ▶ Decision diagram: Include or exclude the k -th item
- ▶ Selection diagram: Include **exactly 1** item



Selection diagram

At step k :

- ▶ Decision diagram: Include or exclude the k -th item
- ▶ Selection diagram: Include **exactly 1** item




$$\hat{x} = (1, 1, 1, 0)$$

$$(p - t)^\top \hat{x} = 3 - t_1 - t_2 - t_3$$

Selection diagram

At step k :


- Decision diagram: Include or exclude the k -th item
- Selection diagram: Include **exactly 1** item




$$\hat{x} = (1, 1, 1, 0)$$

$$(p - t)^\top \hat{x} = 3 - t_1 - t_2 - t_3$$

Dynamically-generated constraints in SD




Dynamically-generated constraints in SD



$$\hat{x} = (0, 1, 0, 1)$$

$$(p - t)^\top \hat{x} = 2 - t_2$$


Dynamically-generated constraints in SD



$$\hat{x} = (1, 1, 1, 0)$$

$$(p - t)^\top \hat{x} = 3 - t_1 - t_2 - t_3$$


Dynamically-generated constraints in SD



$$\hat{x} = (1, 0, 0, 1)$$

$$(p - t)^\top \hat{x} = 2 - t_1$$

Dynamically-generated constraints in SD



$$\hat{x} = (0, 0, 1, 1)$$

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
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Experiments


- ▶ VF: value function
- ▶ SD N: selection diagram with N nodes in layer 3
- ▶ DD W: decision diagram with maximum width W and item grouping (≤ 20 layers)
- ▶ 1 hour time limit

Experiments: knapsack pricing

► Knapsack pricing (KPP): $DD > VF > SD$



(a) KPP - Time (s)



(b) KPP - Optimality gap (%)

Cumulative number of instances solved

Maximum stable set pricing problem

$$\mathbf{R}(t) = \arg \max_x \{(v - t)^\top x \mid A^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}, x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}}\}$$

where $A \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I} \times \mathcal{E}}$ is the node-edge incidence matrix.

Maximum stable set pricing problem

$$\mathbf{R}(t) = \arg \max_x \{(v - t)^\top x \mid A^\top x \leq \mathbf{1}, x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}}\}$$

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
Minimum set cover pricing problem

$$\mathbf{R}(t) = \arg \min_x \{(v + t)^\top x \mid Ax \geq \mathbf{1}, x \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{I}}\}$$

where $A \in \{0, 1\}^{\mathcal{E} \times \mathcal{I}}$ is the incidence matrix between \mathcal{E} and \mathcal{I} .


MaxSSPP: decision diagram

Instance



Sampled solutions: $\{1, 3\}$, $\{2, 5\}$

State: vertices still available




MinSCPP: decision diagram

Instance: $\mathcal{E} = \{a, b, c, d\}$

\mathcal{I} consists of


$$i_1 = \{a, b\}, i_2 = \{a, c\}, i_3 = \{a, d\}, i_4 = \{b, c, d\}, i_5 = \{c\}$$

Sampled solutions: $\{i_1, i_3, i_5\}, \{i_2, i_4\}$




Experiments: Max stable set / Min set cover pricing

- ▶ Max stable set pricing (MaxSSPP): $SD > DD > VF$
- ▶ Min set cover pricing (MinSCPP): $SD \gg DD > VF$



(c) MaxSSPP - Time (s)




(d) MinSCPP - Time (s)

Cumulative number of instances solved

Experiments: Knapsack interdiction problem


- Knapsack interdiction problem (KIP): $DD \gg VF > SD$



Cumulative number of instances solved

Summary

- ▶ Value function reformulations are oblivious to the follower's primal and dual representations.
- ▶ The dual of a follower's primal restriction is a lower bound to the optimal follower's reaction.
- ▶ The dual of the restricted lower-level can be dynamically improved to, at the limit, represent the dual of the lower-level.
- ▶ Branch-and-cut methodology, essentially improving naive value function representations.



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[Vásquez et al., 2025]: single level reformulations for 0-1 linear bilevel programs.

$$\min_{x,y} \left\{ c_L^\top x + c_F^\top y \mid \begin{array}{l} Ax + By \leq a \\ x \in \{0,1\}^{n_L} \\ y \in \mathbf{R}(x) \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\mathbf{R}(x) := \operatorname{argmin}_{\bar{y}} \left\{ d^\top \bar{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} D\bar{y} \leq b - Cx \\ \bar{y} \in \{0,1\}^{n_F} \end{array} \right\}$$

[Vásquez et al., 2025]: Value function reformulation

$$\min_{x,y} \left\{ c_L^\top x + c_F^\top y \mid \begin{array}{l} Ax + By \leq a \\ Cx + Dy \leq b \\ (x,y) \in \{0,1\}^{n_L+n_F} \\ d^\top y \leq \phi(x) \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\phi(x) := \min_{\bar{y}} \left\{ d^\top \bar{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} D\bar{y} \leq b - Cx \\ \bar{y} \in \{0,1\}^{n_F} \end{array} \right\}$$

[Vásquez et al., 2025]: Value function reformulation


$$\min_{x,y} \left\{ c_L^\top x + c_F^\top y \mid \begin{array}{l} Ax + By \leq a \\ Cx + Dy \leq b \\ (x, y) \in \{0, 1\}^{n_L+n_F} \\ d^\top y \leq \phi(x) \end{array} \right\}$$

$$\phi(x) := \min_{\bar{y}} \left\{ d^\top \bar{y} \mid \begin{array}{l} D\bar{y} \leq b - Cx \\ \bar{y} \in \{0, 1\}^{n_F} \end{array} \right\}$$


Transform $\phi(x)$ into a decision diagram.

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- ▶ $n_F + n_L + 1$ layers
- ▶ layers for y : from 1 to $n_F + 1$ with value d_i
- ▶ layers for x : from $n_F + 2$ to $n_L + 1$ with value 0



- ▶ Write DD as a capacitated shortest path problem
- ▶ Write its dual
- ▶ Replace ϕ by the dual



Final thoughts

- ▶ Dualize-and-combine is powerful to obtain single-level reformulations or simply to strengthen single-level relaxations.

Final thoughts

- ▶ Dualize-and-combine is powerful to obtain single-level reformulations or simply to strengthen single-level relaxations.
- ▶ We should focus on “creating more interaction” between primal, dual and upper-level formulations.

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